http://www.thenewanatolian.com/tna-27230.html
Sunnis say the struggle for Kirkuk turns ugly
The New Anatolian / Ankara
22 June 2007
Arab Sunnis say the struggle for Kirkuk may turn ugly after Iraqi
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki forged an alliance with the Kurds to
save his fragile government that was threatened by ouster.
Over the weekend, the London daily Al-Hayat published a two-part
interview with Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq. Talabani, a
seasoned Kurdish nationalist and Iraqi statesman, spoke of the current
conditions in war-torn Iraq, hardships during his years in the
underground, and made interesting references to Kirkuk, the oil-rich
city that is currently witnessing much violence and which Iraqi Kurds
want to be incorporated into Iraqi Kurdistan.
In 1986, as part of his Arabization process, Saddam Hussein called for
the relocation of Arab families to Kirkuk, the center of Iraq’s
petroleum industry, to outnumber the Kurds living there. He also
uprooted thousands of Kurds from Kirkuk. Since the downfall of
Saddam’s regime in 2003, the Kurds have been demanding Kirkuk,
something that the Sunnis curtly refuse, and are returning to the city
en masse.
Some Arab Sunni observers point to the "struggle for Kirkuk" as the
real reason why the Turks are seemingly so serious about invading
Iraqi Kurdistan. If given to the Kurds, the city would add tremendous
political, geographical and financial wealth to Iraqi Kurds, which in
turn threatens neighboring country’s like Turkey, Iran and Syria.
Prime Minister Maliki, in a search for friends in Iraqi domestics, has
allied himself with the Kurds and backed Article 140 which says that a
referendum should be held in Kirkuk to see whether its inhabitants
favor remaining part of Iraq, or being annexed to Kurdistan.
Given that authorities have started, under Maliki’s instigation, to
call on the 12,000 Arab families brought to Kirkuk by Saddam to return
to their Arab districts, the referendum will almost certainly come out
in favor of annexation to Kurdistan.
Sunni political analyst Sami Moubayed commenting in Damascus says
Kurdish aspirations are becoming serious – and dangerous – to Iraqi
Arabs. He says the US is seemingly supportive of these aspirations,
complicating matters all the more for Turkey, Iraqi Arabs and
neighboring Iran, which is also very worried about the future of
Kirkuk.
In his interview, Talabani recalled that at one point, when he raised
the issue of Kirkuk with former prime minister Tarek Aziz, the latter
told him that in this regard, "You [the Kurds] have one right: to weep
as you pass through Kirkuk [since it will never become a Kurdish
city]." Talabani replied: "Thank you Abu Zayd. You are a generous
man." Aziz snapped back: "Are you joking?" Talabani replied: "No. I am
not. There are 15 million Shiites who are deprived the right to weep
on Ashura [a holy Shiite day]; at least you give us the right to
cry."
Kirkuk came to the world’s attention during the era of Iraq’s founder,
King Faisal I, when an oil gusher was discovered in 1927. The oil
field was put into operation by the Iraqi Petroleum Company in 1934
and has been producing oil ever since, currently making up to 1
millions barrels per day (half of all Iraqi oil exports).
By 1998, Kirkuk still had reserves of 10 billion barrels. At the time
of the downfall of Saddam’s regime, the city (250 kilometers north of
Baghdad) had a population of 755,700. In 1973, Kurdish leader Molla
Mustafa Barzani laid formal claim to Kirkuk, something that the regime
of Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr considered a declaration of war.
By 1974, authorities in Baghdad had split the district in two, naming
the area around it al-Ta’mim, and redrawing its borders to give it an
Arab majority. According to Human Rights Watch, from 1991 until 2003,
Saddam systematically expelled an estimated 120,000 Kurds from Kirkuk
and other towns and villages, to increase their Arab population. Since
coming to Iraq in 2003, the Americans have never concealed their
interest in oil.
Due to numerous attacks on Iraqi oil fields in 2003-04, including the
country’s 7,000-kilometer pipeline system, the US set up Task Force
Shield to guard oil fields, particularly in the Kirkuk district. In
January 2004, the Los Angeles Times quoted Kurdish politician Barham
Salih, also the deputy prime minister of Iraq under Maliki, as saying,
"We have a claim to Kirkuk rooted in history, geography and
demographics." If this claim is not acknowledged, he added, it would
be a "recipe for civil war". Watching all of the above – and taking
sides – is Maliki. The Shiites of Iraq are generally in a dilemma with
the Kurds. The Kurds are overwhelmingly pro-American, with an alliance
with the United States that dates to the 1970s under secretary of
state Henry Kissinger.
The Shiites are not particularly pro-American. One thing that brings
part of the Shiites closer to the Kurds is the issue of autonomy.
Certain Shiite groups, headed by the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
(SIIC) have repeatedly called for creating an autonomous Shi’ite
district in southern Iraq, similar to the Kurdish one in the north.
Arab Sunni analysts across the Middle East feel this leaves the Iraqi
Sunnis, who favor unity and Arab nationalism, stranded in the middle –
where there is no oil. Maliki, who faces tremendous pressure for his
repeated failure to bring stability to Iraq and disarm the militias,
has one of two choices. Either he has to reconcile with the Sunnis,
which is difficult given his sectarian upbringing, or with the Kurds.
Making friends with both, or continuing to alienate both, is
impossible. Relying on support within his Shi’ite community is no
longer enough, especially since many parties in the all-Shiite United
Iraqi Alliance have started to lose faith in his leadership.
Reconciliation with the Sunnis – in as much as this is being called
for by the Americans – is difficult for Maliki.
In his heart of hearts, he does not want it. He wants to punish the
Sunnis collectively because Saddam was one of them and because they
refused to recognize and support a new, Shiite-led post-Saddam Iraq.
His alliance with Shiite military groups, like the Mahdi Army of
Muqtada al-Sadr, which has engaged in sectarian war with the Sunnis
since 2004, makes a rapprochement with the Sunnis even more difficult.
The friendship between Iraqi Sunnis and neighboring or regional Sunni
Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Syria is even more
alarming to Maliki, who fears that they are all conspiring to bring
down his government and replace him with the secular former prime
minister Iyad Allawi.
Last week, Maliki addressed Iraqi officers, calling on them to strike
"with an iron fist" at whoever tried to work with outside forces
against the political process (forgetting perhaps that he is a product
of "outside" meddling in Iraqi affairs). Maliki’s statement came after
Sunni Vice President Tarek al-Hashemi openly called for neighboring
Arab states to help Iraqi Sunnis maintain the Sunni and Arab character
of Iraq, and wrestling it from the hands of Shiite politicians,
militias – and Iran.
Although they had differences in the past over the distribution of
power between the president and his prime minister, Maliki and
Talabani have reconciled to prevent the Allawi scenario from
materializing. For one thing, Allawi would never allow militias to
operate – neither the Kurdish Peshmerga nor the Shiite Madhi Army nor
the Badr Brigade of the SIIC. Nor would Allawi support the idea of
further autonomy for the Shi’ites. Talabani’s interview in Al-Hayat
showed strong messages of support for Maliki and the Shiites, who in
turn are reciprocating with support on the issue of Kirkuk.
Trying to defend the Iraqi Shiites from accusations of being agents of
the Iranians, Talabani said, "I think that the Shiites of Iraq will
never follow the Shiites of Iran. They are in disagreement with Iran
over the issue of vilayat-e-faqih [rule of the clergy]. This is a big
issue, reminding us of the international community movement and the
differences between China and Russia. Najaf [located in Iraq] is the
Shiite Vatican and not Qum or Mashad [located in Iran]. Most of the
Shiite shrines are located in Iraq [not Iran]."
He added that as Shi’ite leaders living in Iran under Saddam did not
make them agents of the Iranians: "We all resided in Iran, but that
doesn’t make us Iranian." Sunni Arab analysts say Talabani was making
a poor argument, claiming that it was Iran that followed Iraqi Shiites
and not the other way around. Historically this may be correct, but in
today’s world, Talabani knows that Iran is an international Shiite
superpower that has control over Shiites worldwide, and not only in
Iraq.
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani of Iraq, for example, is an Iranian who
does not even have an Iraqi passport. In another gesture, Muqtada came
out recently in favor of reconciliation with Iraqi Sunnis – something
that is very difficult but which if it happens could give a great
boost to Maliki’s standing in Iraqi domestic politics.
Sunnis say a stronger Maliki means stronger support for the Kurds and
the Shiites. Muqtada called for an end to sectarian violence and
announced that after a recent attack on a Sunni shrine, he contacted
Sunni leaders and offered to have his army protect holy Sunni places
of worship, suggesting joint prayers between Sunnis and Shiites. The
Sunnis turned him down, however, not for security reasons, as they
claimed, but because simply they trust neither Muqtada nor his boss,
the prime minister.
Muqtada then spoke of a possible coup to oust Maliki, saying that this
would be a coup against so-called "Shiitification", but added that
Maliki’s government was not governing in a Shiite manner, but was
closer to being secular. He warned the Arab states that are supportive
of ending Maliki’s tenure in office, saying: "The Arabs need Iraq more
than Iraq needs them. What is happening here can explode in their own
countries."
He also denied links to Iranian intelligence. Muqtada has his own
reasons for fearing Allawi since, when serving as prime minister in
2004, the man launched a ruthless war against the Mahdi Army and has
promised to crush it if he returns to power. As all of this was
happening, violence ripped through Iraq over the weekend, claiming
that lives of over 50 people on Friday, with two car bombs in Basra
and another in Kirkuk. Sunni clerics at Friday prayers accused Maliki
of compliance with Shiite militias.
Analysts say one month ago it seemed that Maliki’s days were numbered
and sources in Baghdad claimed that the United States had given him a
deadline of June 30 to get his act together, given their great
disappointment at how his Baghdad security plan had failed.
He had to end the violence, disarm the militias and reconcile with the
Sunnis, or leave office. The political activity of Allawi, and his
visit to numerous Arab states, highlighted speculation that he was
preparing to replace Maliki and had promised the Americans to do all
of what Maliki had failed to achieve since coming to power in May
2006. Things then started to change in Baghdad.
There is increasing fear that an Iraq without Maliki at this stage
would spell more danger for the region as a whole, and more sectarian
violence in Baghdad. In as much as the Americans want to "punish"
Maliki for failing to curb sectarian violence, they also need Maliki
to prevent the repetition of the same kind of violence if there is
ever a cabinet change in Baghdad.
The argument now seems: having him, with all his shortcomings, is
better than dealing with the unknown if he leaves office. Maliki’s
reconciliation with the Kurds, his stance on Kirkuk, the support of
Talabani (who has President George W Bush’s ear), and fear from the
unknown under Allawi have seemingly sent the June 30 deadline into
history. David Satterfield, the assistant secretary of state for Iraq,
was quoted in Al-Hayat on June 10 as saying that Washington had
complete faith in Maliki.
Sunni Arab analysts say that brings all talk about a near post-Maliki
Iraq to a halt, and automatically, heightens fears on what the future
of Kirkuk might be, given Maliki’s stance on the Kurdish affair, his
support for the referendum and his rapprochement with Talabani.
Satterfield’s words turn a new chapter in "the struggle for Kirkuk" –
a chapter that if carried out as planned spells trouble and violence
for Iraq and the whole region.